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RECENT DECISIONS
(2) Was it on an emergency call at the time?13
(3) a) Was the driver operating his vehicle negligently as to
speed, lookout and management and control?
b) Was the driver operating his vehicle in a reckless man-
ner as to going through stop signs, driving on the wrong
side of the road, and right of way ?14
ROBERT WATSON
The Alcohol-blood test in Wisconsin-Wisconsin's legal position
in regard to the alcohol-blood test has recently been clarified in large
part by State v. Kroening (1956).1 Defendant was the driver of a
car which was involved in a head-on collision in the opposite lane
of travel. Four persons in the other vehicle were killed and defendant
was rendered unconscious. He was taken to a hospital where a nurse,
acting upon the order of the District Attorney, removed a small quan-
tity of blood from his arm for the purpose of obtaining a specimen
for an alcohol-blood test. At the time the blood was removed, defend-
ant was not under arrest and was still unconscious. Nine days later he
was charged with, and subsequently convicted of, negligent homicide,
analysis having shown an alcohol content of .13 of 1% of alcohol by
weight.2 Defendant made timely objection to the introduction of the
results of the test into evidence upon three grounds which the Circuit
Court certified to the Supreme Court: First, that admission of such
evidence would constitute a violation of the Wisconsin Constitution,
Art. I Sec. 8, which provides that:
"No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself."
Second, that admission would violate the Wisconsin Constitution, Art.
I, Sec. 11, which provides that:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated."
Third, that admission would violate the Federal Constitution, Four-
teenth Amendment, which provides that:
"[No] state [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.
13 It is for the jury to decide whether the situation presented to the mind of the
driver was such as would, under all the circumstances present, require him
to operate his vehicle as he did. Ibid., at 286.
14 The Montalto Case is the only recent Wisconsin case dealing with this prob-
lem. See also Suren v. Zuege, 186 Wis. 264, 201 N.W. 722 (1925) which is in
accord with the present decision and Swartz v. Sommerfeldt, 272 Wis. 17, 74
N.W. 2d 632 (1956) in which the standard of care required of emergency
vehicles was not before the Court on appeal.
1274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956).
2 WIs. STATS. §325.235 (1955).
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To these contentions the Wisconsin Supreme Court answered that
the Wisconsin self-incrimination privilege does not apply to the alco-
hol-blood test situation; but that under the facts of the case the evi-
dence had been obtained by a search and seizure prohibited under
Wisconsin law; and that the denial of defendant's rights by the ille-
gal search necessarily resulted in a denial of due process as guaranteed
by the U.S. Constitution.
I. SELF INCRIMINATION
Defendant's contention that introduction of the alcohol-blood test
evidence would violate the privilege aganist self-incrimination was
necessarily based upon the privilege as conferred by the Wisconsin
Constitution rather than upon the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution. It is well settled thaf the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, the only provision by which the Fifth Amendment could
be made applicable to the states, does not include within the meaning
of due process the self-incrimination feature of the Fifth Amend-
ment.3 The applicability of the Wisconsin guarantee depends upon
the scope of the privilege as determined by the Wisconsin Court. The
State contended that the privilege is to be restricted to testimonial com-
pulsion, i.e. oral or written evidence, and "has no application to physical
evidence disclosed by compulsory examination of defendant's person
or attire or by compulsory entry into defendant's body."'4 Defendant's
position was that in Wisconsin the privilege has been extended beyond
testimonial compulsion and ought apply to the compulsory taking of
blood for use as evidence against defendant in a criminal proceeding.
Previous Wisconsin cases appeared to leave the matter in doubt. Thorn-
ton v. State (1903),- although it stated that " . . . it has become fully
established that the prohibition against one's being compelled to be
a witness against himself should not be limited to exclusion of merely
oral statements,"6 held that it was not error to admit physical evidence
consisting of a comparison between tracks in the snow near the place
where defendant allegedly committed the crime and a shoe belonging
to defendant. The distinction made by Thornton between certain ex-
ternal observables, which must be disclosed, and more private bodily
matters, revelation of which may not be compelled, was substantially
approved in Jessner v. State (1930)7 and State v. Zuehlke (1941)8 In
Green Lake County v. Domes (1945) 9 the Court determined that the
3Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97 (1908); State
v. Lloyd, 152 Wis. 24, 139 N.W. 514 (1913).
4 Plaintiff's (State's) brief, at 3, submitted in Kroening case.
5117 Wis. 338, 93 N.W. 1107 (1903).
6 Ibid., 117 Wis. at 341; 93 N.W. at 1108.
7202 Wis. 184, 231 N.W. 634 (1930).
8239 W'is. 111, 300 N.W. 746 (1941).
9 247 Wis. 90, 18 N.W. 2d. 348 (1945).
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admission into evidence, for the purpose of establishing intoxication,
of physical facts disclosed by a compulsory physical examination of one
criminally charged with drunken driving did not violate the privilege
against self-incrimination. The examination included observation of
mental attitude, odor of breath, congestion in the eyelids, pulse, hand-
writing, observation of gait, speech, tongue, knee reflexes, and ability
to touch tip of nose with finger. However, the defendant was under
arrest at the time of the examination, and there was no invasion of his
body for purpose of obtaining blood or other body fluid. The Domes
decision inclined some writers to believe that Wisconsin had definitely
taken the position that the privilege is to be limited to testimonial, as
distinguished from physical evidence.' 0 This belief was apparently
strengthened by the holding in City of Barron v. Covey (1955)11 that
admission into evidence of the fact that defendant in a prosecution
for drunken driving refused to submit a urine sample for alcohol
analysis would not have violated the privilege, although as a matter
of fact the trial court in its discretion'12 excluded the testimony. This
holding of necessity had to rest on the ultimate conclusion that the
privilege itself did not extend so far. With apparent approval the Court
stated:
"For additional authorities holding that constitutional provisions
against self-incrimination are confined to testimonial utterances
see 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed.), pp. 374, sec. 2265; Morgan,
The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, in 59 Howard Law Review,
481, 523; Anno. 164 ALR 967, 972..."13
Faced with this judicial history, the Court in the present case de-
cided that the Wisconsin rule against self-incrimination extends beyond
testimonial evidence, 4 but does not extend so far as to include analysis
of blood for determination of alcohol content.25 It appears that the
10 See William A. Paltz, Work of the Wisconsin Suprene Court-Crim-
inal Law and Related Cases, 46 Wis. L. REv. 53, at 56; and Norris MKalonwy,
A Code of Evidence for Wisconsin-Self-Incrimination, 46 Wis. L. REv.
147, at 150.i1271 Wis. 10, 72 N.W. 2d. 387 (1955).
12 Before Wis. Laws 1955 c. 510-Wis. STATS. §325. 235 (1955), amended former
§85.13 (2), the trial court had discretion in admitting alcohol-blood test evi-
dence. The present statute is mandatory.
"3271 Wis. 10, at 13, 72 N.W. 2d. 387, at 388 (1955).
"4 State v. Kroening, 79 N.W. 2d 810, at 813 (1956).
"We said, 117 W. at 341, 93 N.W. at 1108, 'that the prohibition against
one's being compelled to be a witness against himself should not be
limited to exclusion of merely oral statements against himself!' Once it
is admitted that the right not to be a witness against one's self in a
criminal case extends beyond mere oral statements, the line of demar-
cation beyond which it shall be held that a defendant's right has been
violated is neither straight nor clearly marked."
15Ibid. 79 N.W. 2d, 810, 814.
"We conclude now that the Domes and Covey decisions require us to
answer that an analysis of a person's bodily fluids against his will in
a criminal case and explanatory testimony thereon by the analyst does
1957]
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Court has thus clearly indicated the two extremes, but the nature of
the area between remains in doubt, for no Wisconsin case has been
found in which it was sucessfully claimed that the admission of some
physical fact constituted a violation of the Wisconsin privilege.
II. SEARCH & SEIZURE
1 6
Since in the present case the blood was obtained without a search
warrant, the question arises as to the circumstances in which such a
search can be considered reasonable and hence constitutional." Wis-
consin cases hold that a search of person or immediate surroundings
made incident to arrest, i.e. immediately after valid arrest, even though
without a search warrant, does not violate the Wisconsin prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 8 However, in the present
case, the defendant was not arrested until nine days after the blood
was taken. The question then arises as to whether, as contended by
the State, the fact that search preceded arrest is immaterial and does
not prevent the search from being incident to the arrest 9 where prob-
able cause exists to arrest the person searched without warrant. With-
out expressly deciding this issue the court stated, on the authority of
Hoyer v. State (1923) ,20 in which an arrest one day after search was
held too late to save the search, that a time interval of nine days be-
tween search and arrest was clearly too long to allow the search to
be classified as incident to the arrest. The basic problem is still open
in Wisconsin, however, for neither the present case nor, it is believed
not violate his privilege against self-incrimination within the meaning
of sec. 8, art I, Wis. Const."
16 The Fourteenth Amendment's search and seizure provision applies to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment (Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69
S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). But uniformity does not exist in the meth-
od of implementation of the privilege. Thus, while evidence obtained by fed-
eral officers in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is inadmisable upon
criminal trial in federal courts, (Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383, 34 C.Ct. 341,
58 L. Ed. 652 (1914)), the states are left free to determine for themselves
whether they will admit or exclude such evidence (Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 69 8. Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949) ; Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S.
117, 72 S.Ct. 118, 96 L.Ed. 138 (1951); Irvine v. People of the State of
California, 347 U.S. 128, 74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561 (1954)). Wisconsin has
adopted the federal rule and excludes the evidence (State v. Cox, 258 Wis.
162, 45 N.W. 2d 100 (1950); State v. Drew, 217 Wis. 216, 257 N.W. 681
(1934); Glodowski v. State, 196 Wis. 265, 220 N.W. 227 (1928); Heyer v.
State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. (1923)).
17The test of reasonableness is given in the words of the privilege, §11, Art
I, Wisconsin Constitution:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers.
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated."
'1 State v. Phillips. 262 Wis. 303, 55 N.W. 2d 384 (1952); State ex rel Tess-
ler v. Kubiak, 257 Wis. 159, 42 N. W. 2d, 496 (1950) ; State v. Flanagan, 251
Wis. 517, 29 N.W. 2d 771 (1947) ; Scaffido v. State, 215 Wis. 389. 254 N.W.
651 (1934); Hoch v. State, 199 Wis. 63, 225 N.W. 191 (1929); Thornton v.
State, 117 Wis. 338, 93 N.W. 1107 (1903).
19 See: olaintiff's (State's) brief at 16. submitted in the Kroening case.
20 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89, 27 A.L.R. 673 (1923).
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any of the earlier decisions may be characterized as authority for the
proposition that arrest may in any instance follow search. In State v.
Hoffman (1944) ,21 although arrest followed search, the search was
at all times reasonable and valid without regard to an arrest, because
a statute gave officers the right to enter tavern premises to determine
whether there was any violation of beverage tax laws. In Potman
v. State (1951)22 there appears to have been no true search by police
officers, but only the acceptance of evidence, to wit, the partially de-
composed body of an infant, found by garage mechanics in the trunk
of a car in their custody after their own search. Nor can support be
obtained from Wisconsin cases involving illegally possessed liquor,
wild life, or other such articles. Illustrative of this type of case is:
Wilder v. Miller (1926)23 (alcohol and whiskey in auto in violation of
prohibition laws), Hallbach v. State (1929)24 (whiskey in auto in vio-
lation of prohibition laws), and State v. Leadbetter (1933)25 (trout
caught and transported in auto during closed season in violation of
conservation laws). The U.S. Supreme Court in Carroll v. U.S.
(1925)26 made clear that for purposes of determining the legality of
a search and seizure, distinction must be made between articles which
themselves offend aganist the law, such as alcohol possessed in viola-
tion of prohibition laws, and articles possession of which is not in
itself independently a violation. This latter category would include,
for example, clothing or, it would seem, blood of the person searched
which might be used as evidence against him in a trial for some crimi-
nal offense. In both cases the basic norm is the reasonableness of the
search. However, assuming for the moment that in both the require-
ment of a search warrant could be excused,2 7 in the first instance the
validity of the search depends upon the reasonable cause the officer
has for believing that the person or place searched is in possssion of,
or contains illegal articles. In the second instance the validity depends
upon the right to arrest without a warrant. In Carroll, the defendant
argued that the whiskey found after search of their car was obtained
by an unlawful search, inasmuch as the officers had no basis upon
which they might have arrested the defendants without a warrant be-
fore the search. To this the Court replied:
"The argument of defendants is based on the theory that
the seizure in this case can only be thus justified. If their theory
21 245 Wis. 367, 14 N.W.2d 146 (1944).
22259 Wis. 234, 47 N.W.2d 884 (1951).
23 190 Wis. 136, 208 N. W. 865 (1926).
24200 Wis. 145, 227 N.W. 306 (1929).
25210 Wis. 327, 246 N.W. 443 (1933).
26267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).
27 See Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S., 132, at 153; 45 S.Ct. 280, at 285; 69 L.Ed. 543,
at 551 for instances when requirement of a search warrant may be excused.
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were sound, their conclusion would be. The validity of the sei-
zure then would turn wholly on the validity of the arrest with-
out a seizure. But the theory is unsound. The right to search
and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right
to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing
officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend
against the law . . .The character of the offense for which,
after the contraband liquor is found and seized, the driver can
be prosecuted does not affect the validity of the seizure."2 8
Although no specific Wisconsin authority supports the point that
arrest may follow a search, it is probable that a search under such
circumstances could be upheld if the arrest followed so shortly after
the search that the two could reasonably be regarded as simultaneous. 29
It would, of course, be necessary that the right to make the arrest
could be successfully asserted without resort to support from whatever
evidence was discovered by the search. The present case appears to
determine that the permissible maximum time lag may be somewhere
short of one day.
The Wisconsin Court has also indicated that it will be difficult for
the State, in the alcohol-blood test situation, to show that probable
cause exists to arrest the defendant without a warrant.2 0 In its argu-
ment the State maintained that Kroening could have been arrested
on probable cause because he was the driver of an automobile involved
in an accident in the opposite lane of travel and on being admitted to.
the hospital smelled of liquor. The Court replied that "the statement
of facts in the report of the learned trial court hardly warrants th!
assumption that there was probable cause to arrest Kroening without
warrant... "31
The question left unresolved is whether the result in State v. Kroe-
ning would have been different if there had been no violation of the
Wisconsin constitutional provision on searches and seizures. What if
the defendant had been under valid arrest, with or without warrant for
arrest, or if a search warrant had been obtained, before the blood was
taken? Would the evidence of the test have then been admissible?
Such would seem to be the corollary to the decision except for the
fact that Wisconsin had not yet answered the basic and primary ques-
tion of whether the results of a compulsary alcohol-blood test may
ever be used as evidence against the defendant in a criminal proceed-
ing. In no Wisconsin case has such evidence been successfully intro-
duced. It is possible that when the issue again arises, defendant may
be successful in excluding the evidence on the ground of violation of
the Wisconsin guarantee of due process.
28 Ibid., 267 U.S. at 158-9.
29 See plaintiff's (State's) brief at 17 et seq., submitted in the Kroening case.
30 If the state can show probable cause to arrest without a warrant it will be




The Kroening case decided that the defendant's rights under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion had been violated. The grounds, however, for so deciding rendered
the holding incidental and of little future value. The Court commented:
"But it appears to us that evidence admitted in violation of
defendantes rights under the state constitution is a denial to him
of due process of Wisconsin law, and for a state to violate
its own constitution to the prejudice of the defendant in a crim-
inal case is to deny him process within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 32
Of more importance is the question whether, positing no violation of
state self-incrimination privilege or state or federal search and seizure
protection, the State may extract blood from a defendant without his
consent for the purpose of performing thereon an alcohol-blood test
and introduce the findings into evidence against the defendant in a
criminal prosecution without thereby necessarily offending either fed-
eral or state due process provisions.
It is now definitely settled that this may be done without giving of-
fense to federal due process.3 3 Expressly stating what had obviously
long been its opinion,34 the U.S. Supreme Court in early 1957 in
Breithaupt v. Abram,3 5 decided that the Fourteenth Amendment was
not offended by removal of blood from the body of an unconscious,
non-consenting, defendant for the purpose of an alcohol-blood test. The
defendant was convicted of involuntary (automobile accident) man-
slaughter and received six to ten years in the New Mexico penitentiary.
The opinion was supported by observations that "there is nothing
brutal or offensive in the taking of a sample of blood when done, as
in this case, under the protective eye of a physician,"36 and " . . . cer-
tainly the test as administered here would not be considered offensive
by even the most delicate,"3 7 and "the increasing slaughter on our
31 State v. Kroening, 79 N.W. 2d 810, at 815.
32 Ibid., at 816-17.
a3 The possible effect on federal due process is relevant because the U.S. Su-
preme Court can review state court criminal convictions under the general
authority of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952); Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029 (1945) ; Brown v. Mis-
sissippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936).
34 See: Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.
2d 1396 (1952) ; Block v. People, 125 Col. 36, 240 P.2d 512, cert. den. 343 U.S.
978, 72 S.Ct. 1076, 96 L.Ed. 1370 (1952) ; People v. Haeusler, 41 Cal. 2d. 252
260 P.2d 8, cert., den 347 U.S. 931 (1953); Walton v. People, 24 L.W. 3007(1954), cert. den. after argument and briefs, on grounds that no federal
question was involved, 350 U.S. 868 (1954).
sr U.S.-77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed. 2d 448 (1957).
36 Ibid., 77 S.Ct. at 410, 1 L.Ed. 2d at 451.
37 Ibid., 77 S.Ct. at 410, 1 L.Ed. 2d at 451.
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highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astound-
ing figures only heard of on the battlefield." 38
It would seem, however, that the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not entirely denied a defendant in this position. If he
is fortunate enough to be conscious at the time the authorities attempt
to remove his blood he might put up a determined struggle, causing
the officials to likewise resort to less gentle means, perhaps a most
violent type of force. He might thus bring his plea within the doctrine
of the Rochin case39 and secure application of the due process clause
on the ground that the evidence was secured by "conduct that shocks
the conscience" 40 and by "methods that offend a sense of justice."4 1
Under the Rochin doctrine consciousness and a willingness to oppose
the authorities with physical force are put at a premium and seem to
be conditions precedent to the existence of constitutional rights in
the U.S. Supreme Court.
It is submitted that the unconscious and non-fighting Wisconsin
defendant may yet entertain some hope that the evidence will in the
last analysis be inadmissible, even if obtained with search warrant or
when defendant is under arrest, because of the Wisconsin due process
clause, Artcle I, Section 8, Wisconsin Constitution:
"No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law ... "
No Wisconsin case has yet raised this defense, but then, as previously
observed, no Wisconsin case has yet permitted the results of an al-
cohol-blood or related test to be introduced into evidence in a criminal
prosecution. The defense of violation of a state due process clause
has, unfortunately, not been popular in the alcohol-blood test cases.
42
If the defense is raised in Wisconsin, however, it seems that a number
of valid arguments could be presented.
The philosophy of the U.S. Supreme Court ought not to sway the
Wisconsin Court. The argument which the U.S. Supreme Court has
used 43 to deny application of the federal due process clause overlooks
38 Ibid., 77 S.Ct. at 412, 1 L.Ed. 2d at 453.
39 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R. 2d
1396 (1952), wherein state authorities used a stomach pump to extract some
narcotic capsules which defendant had swallowed. Conviction for possessing
morphine followed, based on the evidence of the capsules. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the conviction because the total course of conduct showed
violation of federal due process.
40 Ibid., 342 U.S. at 172.
41 Ibid., 342 U.S. at 173.
42 See: 127 A.L.R. 1513; 159 A.L.R. 209; 164 A.L.R. 967; 25 ALR 2d 1407.
In this connection note also State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935
(1902); and criticism thereon in Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal As-
pects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication, 24 IOWA L. REV. 191(1939).




discussion and analysis of the nature and essentials of the act of en-
tering the body of the defendant against his will to obtain evidence
for use against him in criminal proceeding, and relies instead on acci-
dentals such as the means used, the presence of a doctor, and the ef-
fect on the conscience and senses of the judges hearing the case.
The police power of the state does not justify use of the blood-test
in getting evidence for a criminal prosecution. Cases upholding blood
test requirements in marriage license, paternity, and venereal disease
situations do not furnish a direct analogy because they do not involve
criminal prosecutions. There is no prudent reason for denying use
of the compulsory test in the non-criminal cases. In criminal cases such
evidence is in conflict with the spirit, if not the letter, of a body of
law that includes a privilege against self-incrimination and a presump-
tion of innocence.
The party objecting on the ground of violation of the state due
process clause could logically claim that if such a decisive and danger-
ous legal step as the admission of this evidence in a criminal proceed-
ing is to be taken in so uncertain an area it ought be taken by the
people themselves through their legislators. In this connection it could
be observed that the present Wisconsin blood-test statute is not com-
pulsory,4 and that a bill45 introduced by Senator Van De Zande in
1953 to the Wisconsin Legislature, on request of the District At-
torney's Association, which would have provided for legally implied
consent to alcohol-blood tests by every user of Wisconsin highways,
failed to pass.
Perhaps the strongest argument to be made against the test with-
out consent is that if the line is not drawn at penetration of the defend-
ant's body, the logical stopping-point has been ignored and exceeded:
"To subject a person against his will to a blood test is an
assault and battery, and clearly an invasion of his personal
privacy. It involves the sticking of a surgical needle into his
body. Perhaps the operation is harmless in the great majority
of cases, although the risk of infection is always present. But
if we admit such an encroachment upon the personal immunity
of an individual where in principle can we stop? Suppose medi-
cal discovery in the future evolvese a technique whereby the
truth may infallibly be secured from a witness by trepanning his
skull and testing the functions of the brain beneath.140
CORNELIUS C. SHIELDS
44 See 53 -Wis. L. REV. 852.
45 Bill 217 S, introduced February 11, 1953.
46 Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A. 2d 80, at 90 (1940). Un-
fortunately the case is not completely relevant to the alcohol-blood test situ-
ation. It involved the question of whether or not the court could require
the defendant in a divorce preceeding and her daughter to submit to one or
more blood-grouping tests to determine the parentage of the daughter.
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